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1, 1954, in Durham v. United States' the Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia, speaking through Judge
Bazelon and with the concurrence of Judges Edgerton and
Washington, directly and unequivocally repudiated the classic M'Naghten test for insanity as a defense in a criminal case. Said the court:
The rule we now hold must be applied on the retrial of this case and in future
cases is not unlike that followed by the New Hampshire Court since 1870. It is
simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect. 2
The M'Naghten test has been with us as a formula for a little over
a century and has from its inception been the subject of bitter controversy. Yet the Durham case is the first time a court, heeding the
criticisms of the test, has explicitly repudiated it. When so basic a
rule which has survived so much criticism for so long a time finally
falls officially, we sense that a great event in law has taken place.
And it remains a great event even though there be disagreement as
to how much difference this change of wording in the test for insanity makes, and even though there be not a little skepticism as to
whether the change makes any difference to the outcome of cases.
Nor does it diminish the novelty of the Durham case that Judge
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1214 F. 2d 862 (App. D.C., 1954). Throughout the remaining articles of this symposium
on insanity, quotations from the Durham case will be cited by page number only.
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Bazelon is not creating a new rule out of whole cloth, but is quite
explicitly adopting the rule New Hampshire has had. The New Hampshire model has been available for adoption for a long time.
The sweep of the decision is underscored by the fact that the District of Columbia had added the "irresistible impulse" test to the
M'Naghten formula in 1929; it is therefore the combined test which
is now found wanting. The decision thus, among other things, marks
the passing of the long debate over irresistible impulse.
The careful and psychologically literate opinion of Judge Bazelon
sparks many reflections about the ends of the criminal law, about the
relationship today of law and psychiatry, about our dependence on
the jury to solve our most difficult questions, about the process of
judicial legislation, about the practical limitations on reform in the
criminal law. I would here pause to emphasize only that the decision
fully retains the moral context of the criminal law. For Judge Bazelon
talks not in the idiom of who best can be deterred by punishment
and who best can be saved by therapy. He talks in terms of whom we
can properly blame. Thus: "Juries will continue to make moral judgments, still operating under the fundamental precept that 'Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose
blame.' "" And again: "Our traditions also require that where such
acts stem from and are the product of a mental disease or defect
...moral blame shall not attach, and hence there will not be criminal
responsibility. ' 4 It is here that I would find the source of much of
the significance, perplexity, and fascination of the issue of criminal
insanity. For it would appear that we cannot in handling the marginally insane criminal readily avoid the profound and pervasive educating impact of law. In deciding publicly whether Monte Durham
goes to jail or goes to a mental hospital the legal system touches
deeply our sense of where the blameworthy, and the praiseworthy,
begins and ends in our daily life.
The details of the case itself and the structure of Judge Bazelon's
opinion appear fully enough in the series of comments that follow.
On its facts, the Durham case was ironically appropriate to the large
purpose for which it was the occasion: it was tried without a jury and
the trial judge, by being so explicit as to the reasoning behind his
finding that there was no evidence of insanity, provides a striking
instance of the difficulties of the M'Naghten rule when taken literally;
'P. 876.
'Ibid.
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it is a case in which the psychiatrist struggles with little success to fit
his testimony to the "right-wrong" formula; it is a case where the
prosecutor bluntly tells the court he is pressing charges chiefly in
order to shift responsibility off his shoulders for any future crimes
Durham might commit and to place it back on St. Elizabeth's Hospital-"then if they let him out on the street it is their responsibility."5
And it is a case in which the difficulties of psychiatric diagnosis are
painfully apparent; Durham prior to this conviction had been in St.
Elizabeth's Hospital four times in six years. And upon each of his first
three releases he soon thereafter committed a crime. The crime for
which he is here convicted was committed only two months after his
release from St. Elizabeth's and only three months before he was
again committed to St. Elizabeth's.
The Durham case, then, is an exciting one, deserving of study. The
editors of the Review have invited several distinguished students of
the problem in the fields of law and psychiatry to comment briefly
on the case. Each commentator has been given a free choice in selecting the aspects of the decision he wished to discuss; each has utilized
a slightly different approach. The result is the informal symposium on
the case here presented.
The editors of the Review had also invited Judge Learned Hand to
participate. Judge Hand declined, but at their insistence he graciously
granted permission to quote from his letters to them-"if you wish to
publish such inconclusive comments as these." Even when declining
to speak, Judge Hand is greatly worth listening to:
I have read the opinion that you mention, and perhaps it is all that can be said;
but, frankly, it did not seem to me to give us any guidance that perceptibly would
help.
The truth appears to me to be that the question goes to the heart of whatever
we choose to make our purpose in criminal punishment. It is only indirectly, or at
second hand, a psychiatric question.
My own ideas, insofar as I have any, are that there are two controlling factors
to consider. One is how far imprisonment is effective as deterrent. . . . The other
factor is that most people have a feeling that "justice" requires a law breaker to
suffer, just as they think that sin should entail suffering in the sinner. Personally
I do not share that feeling, which is a vestige, I believe, of very ancient primitive
and irrational beliefs and emotions. However, it would be unwise, and incidentally
impracticable to disregard it as a constituent element; it is extremely strong in most
people.
5P. 865.

